2022/10/31 by Andreas Christos Pliatsidis · 2 citations
Business, Management and Accounting · Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Public Procurement and Policy #Auction Theory and Applications #Taxation and Compliance Studies
paper · doi:10.1108/jopp-05-2022-0025
openalex publication_date 2022/10/31 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/05/21
Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine how the period for which a public procurement notice remains open for bidding (Δ t ) affects the number of bids. Design/methodology/approach The authors investigated data for 2.404 open procurement tenders in Greece for the years 2018–2021. Using Δ t as the grouping factor, the authors defined two samples based on the European Union time limits for the receipt of tenders. Group 1 (Δ t ≤ 35) contains all tenders for which the contracting authorities (CAs) have chosen to limit themselves to the minimum number of days allowed by law. Group 2 (Δ t >35) includes the remaining tenders where CAs have chosen to keep their notices open for periods beyond the existing minimum time limits, as they are encouraged to do by law. Findings A Mann–Whitney U test, in combination with graphical analysis, revealed that CAs from Group 2 tend to enjoy more bids per tender, that is, more intense competition. Social implications The paper allows decision-makers and legislators to understand the relationship between the time CAs choose to keep their notices open for bidding and the number of bidders in each tender, that is, competition, which according to other authors, affects the outcomes of public procurement procedures. Originality/value The paper fills the research gap regarding the relationship between time for preparation and the number of bids in each tender.