2013/10/01 by R. Thomas Bobal · 3 citations
Arts and Humanities · Social Sciences · #Administration (probate law) #Historical Geopolitical and Social Dynamics #Historical and Contemporary Political Dynamics #Identity (music) #Irrationality #Law #Nationalism #Nationalist Movement #Philosophy #Political economy #Political science #Politics #Race, History, and American Society #Rationality #Sociology
paper · doi:10.1080/07075332.2013.836117
published in The International History Review 35(5), 943-974 (Routledge)
openalex publication_date 2013/10/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/29
This article demonstrates that US beliefs concerning racial identity guided the Eisenhower administration's encounter with Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and Arab nationalism during the 1950s. It establishes that US texts propagated certain racial-identity assumptions about Arab peoples. The most important of these included the assertions that Arab peoples were irrational and easily manipulated or deceived. Policy-makers utilised these beliefs to explain and contextualise Arab actions, especially those of Egypt and its Arab nationalist government. Officials within the Eisenhower administration believed that Arab irrationality prompted Egyptian leaders to adopt a neutralist position in the cold war. The assumption that Arabs were susceptible to deception and manipulation convinced policy-makers that this position was unacceptable. The Soviets would ultimately, they believed, prey upon Arab manipulability and subjugate Egypt, the Arab nationalist movement, and the entire Middle East. These concerns made the Eisenhower administration's decision to contain Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and the Arab nationalist movement seem logical and necessary.