2019/01/24 by Carsten Herrmann‐Pillath · 2 citations
Decision Sciences · Arts and Humanities · Neuroscience · #Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics #Philosophy and History of Science #Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies
paper · doi:10.1017/s0266267118000378
openalex publication_date 2019/01/24 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/01
Abstract Building on an overview of dual systems theories in behavioural economics, the paper presents a methodological assessment in terms of the mechanistic explanations framework that has gained prominence in philosophy of the neurosciences. I conclude that they fail to meet the standards of causal explanations and I suggest an alternative ‘dual functions’ view based on Marr’s methodology of computational neuroscience. Recent psychological and neuroscience research undermines the case for a categorization of brain processes in terms of properties such as relative speed. I defend an interpretation of dualities as functional, without assigning them to specific neurophysiological structures.