2022/08/01 by Ji Yeon Hong, Sunkyoung Park, Hyunjoo Yang · 1 citation
Social Sciences · #China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance #Local Government Finance and Decentralization #Urban Planning and Governance
paper · doi:10.1111/ajps.12716
openalex publication_date 2022/08/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/29
Abstract This study explores how authoritarian distributive policies may not only generate political support for the autocrat but may also help sustain powerful and lasting authoritarian legacies. We use microlevel data from South Korea's New Village Movement, a 1970s rural development program implemented under dictator Park Chung‐hee and widely touted as contributing to the country's rapid economic development. Our analysis shows that townships in receipt of larger cash transfers cast more votes for Park's incumbent party in the subsequent election. More importantly, we show that the effects of the subsidies still appeared almost four decades later in 2012, when the dictator's daughter was democratically elected as the president of South Korea. We show that these effects were not driven by villagers’ long‐term income gains or enhanced social capital due to the program but by the unwavering support of the beneficiary villagers for the dictator, whose legacy remained strong long after democratization.