2017/02/02 by Sergey Radchenko, Bernd Schaefer · 1 citation
Social Sciences · #Korean Peninsula Historical and Political Studies
paper · doi:10.1080/14682745.2016.1265508
openalex publication_date 2017/02/02 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/06/22
The articles argues that in 1971–1973 North Korea’s leader Kim Il Sung used the Sino-American rapprochement and the Soviet-American détente to pursue Korean reunification on his terms; his aim was to ‘democratize’ and then ‘revolutionize’ South Korea and so achieve through dialogue what he failed to achieve through militancy. Kim’s game was based on a misreading of the political dynamics in South Korea and on misplaced confidence in North Korea’s attractiveness. He also misjudged his ability to obtain China’s and the USSR’s backing for his schemes.