1999/09/01 by Ned Markosian · 1 citation
Arts and Humanities · Neuroscience · #Free Will and Agency #Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations #War, Ethics, and Justification
paper · doi:10.1111/1468-0114.00083
openalex publication_date 1999/09/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
The Theory of Agent Causation has always been formulated as an incompatibilist view, but I think that this has been a mistake. The aim of this paper is to argue that, contrary to what agent causation theorists and their opponents have always believed, the most plausible version of the Theory of Agent Causation is actually a compatibilist version of that theory. I formulate the traditional version of the Theory of Agent Causation, and consider a series of objections to it and related views. With each objection comes a corresponding revision of the theory that is motivated by that objection, and with each revision the theory becomes increasingly compatibilistic until, finally, we arrive at a completely compatibilistic version of the Theory of Agent Causation, which I take to be the most plausible version of that theory.