1995/03/01 by Jianzhong Wu, Robert Axelrod · 2 citations
Decision Sciences · Social Sciences · #Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation #Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies #Game Theory and Applications
paper · doi:10.1177/0022002795039001008
openalex publication_date 1995/03/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/04
Noise in the form of random errors in implementing a choice is a common problem in real-world interactions. Recent research has identified three approaches to coping with noise: adding generosity to a reciprocating strategy; adding contrition to a reciprocating strategy; and using an entirely different strategy, Pavlov, based on the idea of switching choice whenever the previous payoff was low. Tournament studies, ecological simulation, and theoretical analysis demonstrate (1) a generous version of tit-for-tat is a highly effective strategy when the players it meets have not adapted to noise; (2) if the other players have adapted to noise, a contrite version of tit-for-tat is even more effective at quickly restoring mutual cooperation without the risk of exploitation; and (3) Pavlov is not robust.