The Democratic Peace and the Wisdom of Crowds

2017/12/01 by Brad L. LeVeck, Neil Narang · 2 citations
Social Sciences · #Political Conflict and Governance #Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies #Culture, Economy, and Development Studies

paper · doi:10.1093/isq/sqx040

openalex publication_date 2017/12/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/06/26

Abstract

This article proposes a new theory for the democratic peace that highlights a previously unexplored advantage enjoyed by democracies in crises. We argue that because democracies typically include a larger number of decision-makers in the foreign policy process, they will produce fewer decision-making errors in situations of crisis bargaining. Thus, bargaining among larger groups of diverse decision-makers will fail less often. In order to test our hypothesis, we use data from experiments in which subjects engage in ultimatum bargaining games. We compare the performance of individuals, small groups and foreign policy experts against the performance of larger groups of decision-makers. We find strong support for the idea that collective decision-making among larger groups of decision-makers decreases the likelihood of bargaining failure.

Citations

• Two Cheers for Bargaining Theory: Assessing Rationalist Explanations of the Iraq War
• Rationalist explanations for war
• Balancing on Land and at Sea: Do States Ally against the Leading Global Power?
• Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes
• Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve
• Domestic Audience Costs in International Relations: An Experimental Approach
• Groups of diverse problem solvers can outperform groups of high-ability problem solvers
• Public Opinion and the Democratic Peace

Cited by

• International reputation and alliance portfolios: How unreliability affects the structure and composition of alliance treaties
• Democratic peace theory [wikipedia]