2007/03/13 by Michel Boyer, Dan Kenigsberg, Tal Mor · 378 citations
Computer Science · Physics and Astronomy · #Adversary #Algorithm #Alice and Bob #Computation #Computer science #Computer security #Encryption #Key (lock) #Key distribution #Law #Notice #Physics #Political science #Public-key cryptography #Quantum #Quantum Computing Algorithms and Architecture #Quantum Information and Cryptography #Quantum Mechanics and Applications #Quantum computer #Quantum key distribution #Quantum mechanics #Quantum network #Quantum pseudo-telepathy #Robustness (evolution) #Theoretical computer science #Theoretical physics #cs.CR #quant-ph
paper · pdf · doi:10.1103/physrevlett.99.140501
published in Physical Review Letters 99(14), 140501 (American Physical Society) · 4 and a bit pages, 1 figure, RevTeX
arxiv created 2007/03/13 · openalex publication_date 2007/10/05 · arxiv updated 2009/12/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/05
Secure key distribution among two remote parties is impossible when both are classical, unless some unproven computation-complexity assumptions are made, such as the difficulty of factorizing large numbers. On the other hand, a secure key distribution is possible when both parties are quantum. What is possible when only one party (Alice) is quantum, yet the other (Bob) has only classical capabilities? We present a protocol with this constraint and prove its robustness against attacks: we prove that any attempt of an adversary to obtain information necessarily induces some errors that the legitimate users could notice.