2007/03/31 by J Poncela, J. Poncela, J Gómez-Gardeñes +5 · 161 citations
Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology · Decision Sciences · Physics and Astronomy · Social Sciences · #Complex network #Dilemma #Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation #Evolutionary dynamics #Evolutionary game theory #Game Theory and Applications #Interdependent networks #Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence #Prisoner's dilemma #Robustness (evolution) #Set (abstract data type) #Social connectedness #physics.soc-ph #q-bio.PE
paper · pdf · doi:10.1088/1367-2630/9/6/184
published in New Journal of Physics 9(6), 184 (IOP Publishing) · 18 pages, 6 figures, revised version accepted for publication in New Journal of Physics (2007)
arxiv created 2007/05/17 · openalex publication_date 2007/06/28 · arxiv updated 2009/12/01 · openalex created_date 2016/06/24 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/05
Recent studies on the evolutionary dynamics of the prisoner's dilemma game in scale-free networks have demonstrated that the heterogeneity of the network interconnections enhances the evolutionary success of cooperation. In this paper we address the issue of how the characterization of the asymptotic states of the evolutionary dynamics depends on the initial concentration of cooperators. We find that the measure and the connectedness properties of the set of nodes where cooperation reaches fixation is largely independent of initial conditions, in contrast with the behaviour of both the set of nodes where defection is fixed, and the fluctuating nodes. We also check for the robustness of these results when varying the degree heterogeneity along a one-parametric family of networks interpolating between the class of Erdős–Renyi graphs and the Barabási–Albert networks.