2007/06/30 by Rui Carvalho, Giulia Iori
Decision Sciences · Physics and Astronomy · #Complex Network Analysis Techniques #Game Theory and Applications #Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence #physics.soc-ph
paper · pdf · doi:10.1103/physreve.78.016110
11 pages, 8 figures, minor corrections
arxiv created 2008/05/29 · openalex publication_date 2008/07/22 · arxiv updated 2009/12/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
We study a modified version of a model previously proposed by Jackson and Wolinsky to account for communication of information and allocation of goods in socioeconomic networks. In the model, the utility function of each node is given by a weighted sum of contributions from all accessible nodes. The weights, parametrized by the variable delta , decrease with distance. We introduce a growth mechanism where new nodes attach to the existing network preferentially by utility. By increasing delta , the network structure evolves from a power-law to an exponential degree distribution, passing through a regime characterized by shorter average path length, lower degree assortativity, and higher central point dominance. In the second part of the paper we compare different network structures in terms of the average utility received by each node. We show that power-law networks provide higher average utility than Poisson random networks. This provides a possible justification for the ubiquitousness of scale-free networks in the real world.