2007/01/01 by Antia Lamas-Linares, Antı́a Lamas-Linares, Christian Kurtsiefer · 1 voice · 5 citations
Computer Science · Physics and Astronomy · #Channel (broadcasting) #Computer science #Computer security #Cryptography #Degrees of freedom (physics and chemistry) #Implementation #Key (lock) #Optics #Physics #Quantum #Quantum Computing Algorithms and Architecture #Quantum Information and Cryptography #Quantum Mechanics and Applications #Quantum channel #Quantum cryptography #Quantum information #Quantum key distribution #Quantum mechanics #Side channel attack #Software engineering #Telecommunications #quant-ph
paper · pdf · doi:10.1364/oe.15.009388
published as Opt. Express 15, 9388 (2007) · 6 pages, 4 figures. Added additional references and extended analysis. Identical to published version
openalex publication_date 2007/01/01 · arxiv published 2007/04/25 · arxiv created 2007/07/17 · arxiv updated 2007/07/17 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/05
The security of quantum key distribution relies on the validity of quantum mechanics as a description of nature and on the non-existence of leaky degrees of freedom in the practical implementations. We experimentally demonstrate how, in some implementations, timing information revealed during public discussion between the communicating parties can be used by an eavesdropper to undetectably access a significant portion of the "secret" key.