2007/04/18 by Viktoriya Semeshenko, Mirta B. Gordon, Jean‐Pierre Nadal +1 · 1 citation
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Physics and Astronomy · Psychology · Social Sciences · #Cognitive science #Complex Systems and Time Series Analysis #Computer science #Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation #Knowledge management #Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence #Psychology #Social learning #Sociology #physics.soc-ph
paper · pdf · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2008.04.019
18 pages, 26 figures
arxiv created 2007/04/18 · openalex publication_date 2008/04/11 · arxiv updated 2009/12/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/05
We consider a social system of interacting heterogeneous agents with learning abilities, a model close to Random Field Ising Models, where the random field corresponds to the idiosyncratic willingness to pay. Given a fixed price, agents decide repeatedly whether to buy or not a unit of a good, so as to maximize their expected utilities. We show that the equilibrium reached by the system depends on the nature of the information agents use to estimate their expected utilities.