From Bell’s Theorem to Secure Quantum Key Distribution

2005/10/13 by Antonio Acín, Antonio Acin, Nicolas Gisin +2 · 2 citations
Computer Science · Medicine · Physics and Astronomy · #Bell state #Bell test experiments #Bell's theorem #Biofield Effects and Biophysics #Computer science #Computer security #Key (lock) #Kochen–Specker theorem #Local hidden variable theory #Physics #Quantum #Quantum Information and Cryptography #Quantum Mechanics and Applications #Quantum channel #Quantum cryptography #Quantum entanglement #Quantum information #Quantum key distribution #Quantum mechanics #Quantum no-deleting theorem #quant-ph

paper · pdf · doi:10.1103/physrevlett.97.120405

published as Phys. Rev. Lett. 97, 120405 (2006) · 5 pages, 2 figures, REVTEX4

arxiv created 2005/10/13 · openalex publication_date 2006/09/20 · arxiv updated 2009/12/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/05

Abstract

The first step in any quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol consists of sequences of measurements that produce correlated classical data. We show that these correlation data must violate some Bell inequality in order to contain distillable secrecy, if not they could be produced by quantum measurements performed on a separable state of larger dimension. We introduce a new QKD protocol and prove its security against any individual attack by an adversary only limited by the no-signaling condition.

Citations

• Quantum nonlocality as an axiom
• Popescu-Rohrlich Correlations as a Unit of Nonlocality
• General properties of nonsignaling theories
• Quantum cryptography based on Bell’s theorem
• Nonlocal correlations as an information-theoretic resource
• On the Einstein Podolsky Rosen paradox

Cited by

• Revealing hidden nonlocality and preparation contextuality for an arbitrary input Bell inequality
• Full Security of Quantum Key Distribution From No-Signaling Constraints