1999/01/01 by Ron Kasznik · 1,264 citations
Business, Management and Accounting · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Psychology · #Accounting #Actuarial science #Association (psychology) #Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance #Business #Earnings #Earnings management #Econometrics #Economics #Financial Markets and Investment Strategies #Financial Reporting and Valuation Research #Forecast error #Psychology #Reputation #Turnover #Voluntary disclosure
paper · doi:10.2307/2491396
published in Journal of Accounting Research 37(1), 57 (Wiley)
openalex publication_date 1999/01/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/31
This study investigates whether managers who issue annual earnings forecasts manage reported earnings toward their forecasts, fearing legal actions by investors and loss of reputation for accuracy. I hypothesize that managers make income-increasing (decreasing) accounting decisions when earnings would otherwise be below (above) management forecasts, and that the earnings management activity is increasing in expected forecast error costs.1 These costs are likely higher for overestimates than for underestimates and are increasing in the magnitude of the forecast