2015/01/02 by Jennifer Trahan · 1 citation
Social Sciences · #Global Peace and Security Dynamics #Human Rights and Development
paper · doi:10.1080/20531702.2015.1042286
openalex publication_date 2015/01/02 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/06/30
Over the last decade and a half, there have been simultaneous developments related to (i) the law on humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect (R2P); and (ii) the International Criminal Court's definition of the crime of aggression. What is not immediately obvious from a facial reading of the definition of the crime of aggression is how these areas of law interrelate with, or complement, each other. Namely, is any state action that might be termed humanitarian intervention or R2P that is planned, prepared, initiated or executed by a state's leaders covered by the ICC's crime of aggression? And, if so, what exactly is or is not covered? With respect to R2P, because any ‘pillar III’ forceful intervention would require UN Security Council approval, this article concludes that R2P is fully consonant with the crime of aggression and actions by individual leaders involved in R2P would not fall within the crime. The article also concludes that because the ICC's crime of aggression jurisdiction is in significant ways consensual, and because there is a ‘grey area’ built into the definition (where anything of arguable legitimacy would not fall within the definition), and for various other reasons, leaders who plan, prepare, initiate or execute a state intervention of unclear legality (humanitarian intervention) also would not fall within the definition of the crime of aggression. The article also argues for a narrowly circumscribed understanding of what ‘humanitarian intervention’ is, lest the entire crime of aggression be subsumed by an overly broad carve-out.