2014/11/14 by Jeff D. Colgan, Jessica L.P. Weeks, Jessica Weeks · 88 citations
Social Sciences · #Democracy #Development economics #Dictatorship #Economics #Government (linguistics) #International Relations and Foreign Policy #International conflict #International relations #Law #Peacebuilding and International Security #Political Conflict and Governance #Political economy #Political science #Politics #Power (physics) #Sociology
paper · doi:10.1017/s0020818314000307
published in International Organization 69(1), 163-194 (University of Cambridge)
openalex publication_date 2014/11/14 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/25
Abstract A consensus exists that countries that have recently undergone domestic political revolutions are particularly likely to become involved in military conflicts with other states. However, scholars seek to understand when and why revolutions increase the likelihood of international violence. In contrast to existing work focusing on international systemic factors, we argue that revolution fosters conflict in part by affecting states’ domestic political structures. Previous research has shown that revolution tends to bring particularly aggressive leaders to power. We demonstrate that revolutions also frequently result in personalist dictatorships, or regimes that lack powerful institutions to constrain and punish leaders. By empowering and ensconcing leaders with revisionist preferences and high risk tolerance, revolutions that result in personalist dictatorships are significantly more likely to lead to international conflict than revolutions that culminate in other forms of government. Our arguments and evidence help explain not only why revolution so commonly leads to conflict, but also why some revolutions lead to conflict whereas others do not.