2024/01/30 by Itai Arieli, Arieli, Itai, Yakov Babichenko +5
Business, Management and Accounting · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) #Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing #FOS: Computer and information sciences #FOS: Economics and business #Merger and Competition Analysis #Theoretical Economics (econ.TH)
paper · pdf · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2401.16942
openalex publication_date 2024/01/30 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/01
We consider a model of third-degree price discrimination where the seller's product valuation is unknown to the market designer, who aims to maximize buyer surplus by revealing buyer valuation information. Our main result shows that the regret is bounded by a (1)/(e)-fraction of the optimal buyer surplus when the seller has zero valuation for the product. This bound is attained by randomly drawing a seller valuation and applying the segmentation of Bergemann et al. (2015) with respect to the drawn valuation. We show that this bound is tight in the case of binary buyer valuation.