1996/01/01 by David A. Lake · 394 citations
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Social Sciences · #Computer science #Corporate governance #Defense, Military, and Policy Studies #Economic system #Economics #Hierarchy #International Relations and Foreign Policy #International relations #International relations theory #Law #Law and economics #Management #Opportunism #Political Conflict and Governance #Political economy #Political science #Politics #Sociology #Soviet union #State (computer science) #Variety (cybernetics)
paper · doi:10.1017/s002081830000165x
published in International Organization 50(1), 1-33 (University of Cambridge)
openalex publication_date 1996/01/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/25
Security relations between states vary along a continuum from anarchic alliances to hierarchic empires. This continuum, in turn, is defined by the parties' rights of residual control. The state's choice between alternatives is explained in a theory of relational contracting as a function of the expected costs of opportunism, which decline with relational hierarchy, and governance costs, which rise with relational hierarchy. A comparison of early postwar relations between the United States and Western Europe and the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe illustrates the theory.