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Sex-oriented stable matchings of the marriage problem with correlated and incomplete information

2001/04/18 by Guido Caldarelli, G. Caldarelli, Andrea Capocci +1 · 1 citation
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Physics and Astronomy · Social Sciences · #Economic theories and models #Family Dynamics and Relationships #Game Theory and Voting Systems #cond-mat.dis-nn

paper · pdf · doi:10.1016/s0378-4371(01)00305-3

5 pages, 2 figures, Proceedings of the NATO ARW on Application of Physics in Economic Modelling, Prague 2001

arxiv created 2001/04/18 · openalex publication_date 2001/10/01 · arxiv updated 2009/11/30 · openalex created_date 2016/06/24 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28

Abstract

In the Stable Marriage Problem two sets of agents must be paired according to mutual preferences, which may happen to conflict. We present two generalizations of its sex-oriented version, aiming to take into account correlations between the preferences of agents and costly information. Their effects are investigated both numerically and analytically.

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