2000/04/13 by R. Florian, Razvan Florian, Serge Galam +1 · 1 citation
Decision Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Physics and Astronomy · #Game Theory and Applications #Game Theory and Voting Systems #Opinion Dynamics and Social Influence #cond-mat.dis-nn
paper · pdf · doi:10.1007/s100510070264
published as Eur. Phys. J. B 16, 189 (2000) · 14 pages, to appear in EPJ B
arxiv created 2000/04/13 · openalex publication_date 2000/06/01 · arxiv updated 2009/11/30 · openalex created_date 2016/06/24 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
Coalition setting among a set of actors (countries, firms, individuals) is studied using concepts from the theory of spin glasses. Given the distribution of respective bilateral propensities to either cooperation or conflict, the phenomenon of local aggregation is modeled. In particular the number of coalitions is determined according to a minimum conflict principle. It is found not to be always two. Along these lines, previous studies are revisited and are found not to be consistent with their own principles. The model is then used to describe the fragmentation of former Yugoslavia. Results are compared to the actual situation.