1999/05/31 by Maya Paczuski, Kevin E. Bassler, √Ålvaro Corral +1 · 4 citations
Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Physics and Astronomy · Social Sciences · #Complex Systems and Time Series Analysis #Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation #Gene Regulatory Network Analysis #adap-org #cond-mat.dis-nn #cond-mat.stat-mech #nlin.AO
paper · pdf · doi:10.1103/physrevlett.84.3185
4 pages, 3 included figures. Some text revision and one new figure added. To appear in PRL
arxiv created 2000/02/07 · openalex publication_date 2000/04/03 · arxiv updated 2009/11/30 · openalex created_date 2016/06/24 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
A model of Boolean agents competing in a market is presented where each agent bases his action on information obtained from a small group of other agents. The agents play a competitive game that rewards those in the minority. After a long time interval, the poorest player's strategy is changed randomly, and the process is repeated. Eventually the network evolves to a stationary but intermittent state where random mutation of the worst strategy can change the behavior of the entire network, often causing a switch in the dynamics between attractors of vastly different lengths.