Property rights theory, transaction costs theory, and agency theory: an organizational economics approach to strategic management

2005/01/01 by Jong-Wook Kim, Joseph T. Mahoney · 1 citation
Business, Management and Accounting · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Corporate Finance and Governance #Capital Investment and Risk Analysis #Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems

paper · doi:10.1002/mde.1218

openalex publication_date 2005/01/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/25

Abstract

Property rights theory has common antecedents with contractual theories of the firm such as transaction costs and agency theories, and is yet distinct from these theories. We illustrate fundamental theoretical principles derived from these three theories by analyzing the business case of oil field unitization. Theoretical principles and application of theory to oil field unitization are each summarized. From this, it is possible to see how property rights theory is well suited to explain business situations where inefficient economic outcomes persist. Additionally, property rights theory forges new theoretical connections with other branches of organizational economics, in particular, resource-based theory. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Citations

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• Attention economy [wikipedia]