2015/09/28 by Eden Lin · 1 citation
Arts and Humanities · Neuroscience · Social Sciences · #Philosophical Ethics and Theory #Free Will and Agency #Political Philosophy and Ethics
paper · doi:10.1017/s0953820815000424
openalex publication_date 2015/09/28 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/05/30
The experience machine was traditionally thought to refute hedonism about welfare. In recent years, however, the tide has turned: many philosophers have argued not merely that the experience machine doesn't rule out hedonism, but that it doesn't count against it at all. I argue for a moderate position between those two extremes: although the experience machine doesn't decisively rule out hedonism, it provides us with some reason to reject it. I also argue for a particular way of using the experience machine to argue against hedonism – one that appeals directly to intuitions about the welfare values of experientially identical lives rather than to claims about what we value or claims about whether we would, or should, plug into the machine. The two issues are connected: the conviction that the experience machine leaves hedonism unscathed is partly due to neglect of the best way to use the experience machine.