The replicator equation and other game dynamics

2014/07/14 by Ross Cressman, Yi Tao · 1 citation
Social Sciences · Decision Sciences · Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology · #Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation #Game Theory and Applications #Evolution and Genetic Dynamics

paper · pdf · doi:10.1073/pnas.1400823111

openalex publication_date 2014/07/14 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/04

Abstract

The replicator equation is the first and most important game dynamics studied in connection with evolutionary game theory. It was originally developed for symmetric games with finitely many strategies. Properties of these dynamics are briefly summarized for this case, including the convergence to and stability of the Nash equilibria and evolutionarily stable strategies. The theory is then extended to other game dynamics for symmetric games (e.g., the best response dynamics and adaptive dynamics) and illustrated by examples taken from the literature. It is also extended to multiplayer, population, and asymmetric games.

Citations

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Cited by

• Overcoming unfairness via repeated interactions in mini-ultimatum game
• Evolutionarily stable state [wikipedia]