1979/04/01 by Eduard Mark · 1 citation
Social Sciences · #Eastern European Communism and Reforms #European history and politics #Historical Geopolitical and Social Dynamics
paper · doi:10.1111/j.1467-7709.1979.tb00310.x
openalex publication_date 1979/04/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/29
In an interesting and useful article that appeared in the Fall 1977 issue of Diplomatic History, Robert L. Messer discussed two proposals for the improvement of relations with the Soviet Union advanced by American diplomats during the last quarter of 1945. Messer demonstrated convincingly that the Department of State was by no means an “ideological monolith” with respect to the U.S.S.R. And this, as he observed, was a fact that very much wanted emphasis, given the long history of “accusations from the Right” and “allegations by New-Left revisionists” about the State Deparment's role in the early cold war.1 The fall of 1945 saw at least one other striking illustration of the still undecided character of much official thinking about the Soviet Union. Apparently at the instigation of his special assistant, Charles E. Bohlen (the coauthor of one of the suggested policies featured in Messer's article), Secretary of State James F. Byrnes publicly and unambiguously stated on 31 October 1945 that the United States accepted a Soviet sphere of influence of a certain kind in Eastern Europe. This little-noticed episode shows, as to the memoranda discussed by Messer, that important officials entertained hopes for a settlement with the U.S.S.R. at a date later than has often been supposed. Perhaps more importantly, however, Byrnes's initiative and the long history behind it underscore the generally unappreciated complexity of the American position of spheres of influence.