1995/08/18 by X. Zotos, P. Prelovšek, P. Prelovsek +1 · 2 citations
Arts and Humanities · Decision Sciences · Physics and Astronomy · #Interdisciplinary Research and Collaboration #Nonlinear Waves and Solitons #Philosophy and History of Science #Philosophy, Science, and History #Quantum chaos and dynamical systems #Quantum many-body systems #cond-mat
paper · pdf · doi:10.1103/physrevb.53.983
revtex file, followed by 5 uuencoded postscript figures
arxiv created 1995/08/18 · openalex publication_date 2002/10/01 · arxiv updated 2009/11/30 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/02
This paper is divided in two parts.In part I, I argue against two attempts to naturalise the notion of scientific representation, by reducing it to isomorphism and similarity.I distinguish between the means and the constituents of representation, and I argue that isomorphism and similarity are common (although not universal) means of representation; but that they are not constituents of scientific representation.I look at the prospects for weakened versions of these theories, and I argue that only those that abandon the aim to naturalise scientific representation are likely to be successful.In part II of the paper, I present a deflationary conception of scientific representation, which minimally characterises it by means of two necessary conditions: representation is essentially intentional and it has the capacity to allow surrogate reasoning and inference.I then defend this conception by showing that it successfully meets the objections and difficulties that make its competitors, such as isomorphism and similarity, untenable.In addition the inferential conception explains the success of various means of representation in their appropriate domains, and it sheds light on the truth and accuracy of scientific representations.