2019/04/16 by Parimal K. Bag, P. Bag, Tridib Sharma · 1 citation
Decision Sciences · Social Sciences · #Auction Theory and Applications #Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies #Game Theory and Applications
paper · doi:10.1111/iere.12407
Abstract Two career‐concerned experts sequentially give advice to a Bayesian decision maker ( D ). We find that secrecy dominates transparency, yielding superior decisions for D . Secrecy empowers the expert moving late to be pivotal more often. Further, (i) only secrecy enables the second expert to partially communicate her information and its high precision to D and swing the decision away from first expert's recommendation; (ii) if experts have high average precision, then the second expert is effective only under secrecy. These results are obtained when experts only recommend decisions. If they also report the quality of advice, fully revealing equilibrium may exist.