2019/04/17 by Flavio Toxvaerd · 73 citations
Mathematics · Medicine · Psychology · Social Sciences · #COVID-19 epidemiological studies #Computer science #Disease #Disease control #Disinhibition #Economics #Environmental health #Externality #Gender, Labor, and Family Dynamics #Immunology #Income, Poverty, and Inequality #Internal medicine #Medicine #Microeconomics #Planner #Psychiatry #Psychology #Serodiscordant #Social Welfare #Social planner #Transmission (telecommunications) #Welfare
paper · open access · doi:10.1111/iere.12402
published in International Economic Review 60(4), 1737-1755 (Wiley)
openalex publication_date 2019/04/17 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/29
Abstract This article studies a model of disease propagation in which rational and forward‐looking individuals can control their exposure to infection by engaging in costly preventive behavior. Equilibrium outcomes under decentralized decision making are characterized and contrasted to the outcomes chosen by a social planner. In general, individuals overexpose themselves to infection, leading to suboptimally high disease prevalence. The model is applied to study the welfare effects of preexposure prophylaxis, which reduces transmission between serodiscordant couples and causes disinhibition. It is shown that a decrease in the induced infection risks increases disease prevalence and can lead to decreases in overall welfare.