2017/07/18 by Richard Gaskin · 1 citation
Psychology · Neuroscience · Arts and Humanities · #Philosophy and Theoretical Science #Embodied and Extended Cognition #Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
paper · doi:10.1093/mind/fzx023
openalex publication_date 2017/07/18 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/10
Abstract It is often held to be definitive of consciousness that there is something it is like to be in a conscious state. A consensus has arisen that ‘is like’ in relevant ‘what it is like’ locutions does not mean ‘resembles’. This paper argues that the consensus is mistaken. It is argued that a recently proposed ‘affective’ analysis of these locutions fails, but that a purported rival of the resemblance analysis, the property account, is in fact compatible with it. Some of the implications of this argument are briefly explored: it is suggested that the meaning of ‘what it’s like’ does not, in itself, have any special bearing on consciousness, and that the implications for the so-called ‘hard problem’ of consciousness are deflationary.