2017/07/31 by Duncan Pritchard · 27 citations
Arts and Humanities · Social Sciences · #Context (archaeology) #Epistemic virtue #Epistemology #Epistemology of Wikipedia #Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics #Externalism #Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies #Philosophy #Political Philosophy and Ethics #Social epistemology #Sociology #Virtue
paper · pdf · doi:10.1080/0020174x.2017.1355842
published in Inquiry 61(5-6), 632-647 (Taylor & Francis)
openalex publication_date 2017/07/31 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/25
What does it take to convert the deliverances of an extended cognitive process into knowledge (i.e. extended knowledge)? It is argued that virtue epistemology, at least of an epistemic externalist kind (virtue reliabilism, as it is known), offers the resources to satisfactorily answer this question, provided that one rids the view of its implicit (and sometimes explicit) commitment to epistemic individualism. Nonetheless, it is also claimed that while virtue reliabilism can accommodate extended cognition, there are limits to the extent to which virtuous epistemic standings can be extended. In particular, it is argued that it is in the nature of intellectual virtue to be directed at non-extended epistemic standings. This point has important implications for an extended virtue epistemology, as is illustrated by considering how this point plays out in the context of the contemporary debate regarding the epistemology of education.