2019/04/02 by Håkon Lunde Saxi · 1 citation
Social Sciences · #Arctic and Russian Policy Studies #European and Russian Geopolitical Military Strategies #Security, Politics, and Digital Transformation
paper · pdf · doi:10.1093/ia/iiz049
openalex publication_date 2019/04/02 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/30
After the end of the Cold War the Nordic states gradually began to work together on military issues beyond UN peacekeeping operations, including in NATO operations, on training and education, as well as on armament development and acquisition. Between 2006 and 2013 these efforts reached their aspirational and rhetorical zenith, as the Nordic states agreed in principle to integrate their armed forces closely. The main catalyst was the conviction that small states could no longer maintain balanced and modern military forces on a purely national basis. The core countries in this integrationist experiment were Norway, Sweden and Finland. The integrationist idea soon faced insurmountable difficulties and expensive setbacks, leading to its quiet abandonment by early 2014. At approximately the same time, the Ukrainian crisis caused a change in the Nordic states' perception of Russia, from a difficult partner to a strategic challenger. The need to work together to meet Russia's revisionist challenge in the Nordic–Baltic region produced a resurgence in Nordic defence cooperation, focused on making the Nordic armed forces able to operate together in a crisis rather than full-blown defence integration. Nordic cooperation today serves as a complement to NATO, the EU and enhanced bilateral cooperation with the major Western states.