Competing interpretations of the stability–instability paradox: the case of the Kargil War

2017/01/02 by Christopher J. Watterson · 2 citations
Social Sciences · Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Nuclear Issues and Defense #International Relations and Foreign Policy #Economic Sanctions and International Relations

paper · doi:10.1080/10736700.2017.1366623

openalex publication_date 2017/01/02 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/29

Abstract

The stability–instability paradox is a well-established concept in the nuclear-security literature, which scholars use to explain sub-strategic militarized conflicts between mutually deterred, nuclear-armed adversaries. Despite its ubiquity, there is a confusion in the literature as to the precise causal mechanism underpinning such conflicts. Competing interpretations of the paradox differ in states' perceptions of nuclear escalatory risk as well as whether the balance of military power or the balance of resolve determines outcomes in these sub-strategic conflicts. Testing their respective explanatory powers in a case study of sub-strategic conflict between nuclear powers—the 1999 Kargil War—demonstrates that these two competing models are mutually exclusive.

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• Wars, fought and unfought : China and the Sino-Indian border dispute
• Stability–instability paradox [wikipedia]

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