Simple Proof of Security of the BB84 Quantum Key Distribution Protocol

2000/03/31 by Peter W. Shor, John Preskill · 8 citations
Physics and Astronomy · #quant-ph

paper · pdf · doi:10.1103/physrevlett.85.441

published as Phys.Rev.Lett.85:441-444,2000 · 5 pages, Latex, minor changes to improve clarity and fix typos

arxiv created 2000/05/12 · arxiv updated 2009/12/01

Abstract

We prove the security of the 1984 protocol of Bennett and Brassard (BB84) for quantum key distribution. We first give a key distribution protocol based on entanglement purification, which can be proven secure using methods from Lo and Chau's proof of security for a similar protocol. We then show that the security of this protocol implies the security of BB84. The entanglement-purification based protocol uses Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) codes, and properties of these codes are used to remove the use of quantum computation from the Lo-Chau protocol.

Cited by

• Numerical security framework for quantum key distribution with bypass channels
• A Directly Modulated Laser Platform for High-Dimensional Quantum Key Distribution
• A Candidate Framework for Free-Space Quantum Key Distribution based on Geometrical-Configuration Modulation
• Quantum Key Distribution Without Shared Reference Frame Under Unital Noise
• Adversarial Reinforcement Learning for Adaptive Eavesdropping in BB84 Quantum Key Distribution
• One-Way Quantum Secure Direct Communication with Choice of Measurement Basis as the Secret
• Single-Satellite Quantum Repeater Performance Analysis
• Beyond the QBER Threshold: A Temporal QBER Based Machine Learning Framework for Multi Attack Detection in BB84 QKD