2007/11/20 by Attila Szolnoki, Matjaz Perc, Matjaž Perc +1 · 1 citation
Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology · Physics and Astronomy · Social Sciences · #Complex Network Analysis Techniques #Evolution and Genetic Dynamics #Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation #cond-mat.stat-mech #physics.bio-ph
paper · pdf · doi:10.1016/j.physa.2007.11.021
published as Physica A 387 (2008) 2075 · 14 pages, 7 figures, to be published in Physica A
openalex publication_date 2007/11/20 · arxiv created 2007/11/26 · arxiv updated 2009/12/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
We study the transition towards effective payoffs in the prisoner's dilemma game on scale-free networks by introducing a normalization parameter guiding the system from accumulated payoffs to payoffs normalized with the connectivity of each agent. We show that during this transition the heterogeneity-based ability of scale-free networks to facilitate cooperative behavior deteriorates continuously, eventually collapsing with the results obtained on regular graphs. The strategy donations and adaptation probabilities of agents with different connectivities are studied. Results reveal that strategies generally spread from agents with larger towards agents with smaller degree. However, this strategy adoption flow reverses sharply in the fully normalized payoff limit. Surprisingly, cooperators occupy the hubs even if the averaged cooperation level due to partly normalized payoffs is moderate.