2005/02/01 by Edward L. Glaeser · 3 citations
Social Sciences · #Economics #Hatred #Incentive #Law #Market economy #Media Influence and Politics #Political economy #Political science #Politics
paper · doi:10.1162/0033553053327434
openalex publication_date 2005/02/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/30
This paper develops a model of the interaction between the supply of hate-creating stories from politicians and the willingness of voters to listen to hatred. Hatred is fostered with stories of an out-group's crimes, but the impact of these stories comes from repetition not truth. Hate-creating stories are supplied by politicians when such actions help to discredit opponents whose policies benefit an out-group. Egalitarians foment hatred against rich minorities; opponents of re-distribution build hatred against poor minorities. Hatred relies on people accepting, rather than investigating, hate-creating stories. Hatred declines when there is private incentive to learn the truth. Increased economic interactions with a minority group may provide that incentive. This framework is used to illuminate the evolution of anti-Black hatred in the United States South, episodes of anti-Semitism in Europe, and the recent surge of anti-Americanism in the Arab world.