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Double-Standard Moralism: Why We Can Be More Permissive Within Our Imagination

2023/02/24 by Mattia Cecchinato · 1 voice
Neuroscience · Arts and Humanities · Psychology · #Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment #Ethics, Aesthetics, and Art #Emotions and Moral Behavior

paper · pdf · doi:10.1093/aesthj/ayad008

openalex publication_date 2023/02/24 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/01

Abstract

Abstract Although the fictional domain exhibits a prima facie freedom from real-world moral constraints, certain fictive imaginings seem to deserve moral criticism. Capturing both intuitions, this paper argues for double-standard moralism, the view that fictive imaginings are subject to different moral standards than their real-world counterparts. I show how no account has, thus far, offered compelling reasons to warrant the moral appropriateness of this discrepancy. I maintain that the normative discontinuity between fiction and the actual world is moderate, as opposed to one that leaves fictive engagements wholly exempt from moral evaluations. I propose a way of addressing the gamer’s dilemma that is compatible with a moderate kind of discontinuity. Finally, I contend that the audience is justified in adopting deviant moral attitudes in fictional situations because their consequences largely differ from those that analogous real-world events would have.

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