2021/01/01 by Julia Langkau · 1 voice
Arts and Humanities · Psychology · #Emotions and Moral Behavior #Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics #Language, Metaphor, and Cognition
paper · doi:10.1017/can.2020.54
openalex publication_date 2021/01/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/05/21
Abstract This paper argues that we should distinguish two different kinds of imaginative vividness: vividness of mental images and vividness of imaginative experiences. Philosophy has focussed on mental images, but distinguishing more complex vivid imaginative experiences from vivid mental images can help us understand our intuitions concerning the notion as well as the explanatory power of vividness. In particular, it can help us understand the epistemic role imagination can play on the one hand and our emotional engagement with literary fiction on the other hand.