2008/01/22 by Avi Kober · 1 voice · 91 citations
Social Sciences · #Ancient history #Battlefield #Computer science #Computer security #Criminology #Deterrence theory #Dominance (genetics) #History #Jewish and Middle Eastern Studies #Law #Middle East Politics and Society #Militarization #Military History and Strategy #Political economy #Political science #Politics #Sociology
paper · pdf · doi:10.1080/01402390701785211
published in Journal of Strategic Studies 31(1), 3-40 (Taylor & Francis)
openalex publication_date 2008/01/22 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/06
Whereas in the past, Israeli successes on the battlefield compensated for deterrence and/or early warning failures, in the Second Lebanon War serious problems in Israeli military capabilities and conduct of war were exposed. The article offers explanations for the poor performance of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF): A late perception that it was war; adherence to post-heroic warfare under circumstances that rather required a different approach; the erosion of the IDF's fighting standards due to policing missions which had become its main task since the outbreak of the first Intifada in 1987; false Revolution in Military Affairs-inspired concepts; the adoption of the notion of controlling instead of capturing territory; a centralized logistic system; poor generalship; a hesitant and inexperienced political leadership, and IDF dominance in decisions on military matters.