2024/04/01 by Karin Silver, Britta Matthes, Hala Alaouié +6 · 1 voice
Business, Management and Accounting · Health Professions · Medicine · #Consumer Attitudes and Food Labeling #Global Health Care Issues #Global Public Health Policies and Epidemiology
paper · pdf · doi:10.1093/heapro/daae038
openalex publication_date 2024/04/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/30
A leaked email published by The Guardian in September 2023 revealed that a senior executive from Philip Morris International (PMI) had instructed staff to find ‘any connection, any lead, whether political or technical’ that could be used to influence the forthcoming Conference of Parties (COP) to the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC) (Marsh, 2023). The WHO FCTC, the first global public health treaty, includes measures to reduce the demand and supply of tobacco (WHO, 2003). Measures tackling demand include increasing public awareness, banning advertising and raising taxes. Supply-side policies include banning sales by and to minors, providing alternatives for tobacco growers and workers and combating illicit trade. At the biennial COP, Parties to the treaty discuss and coordinate efforts to implement the WHO FCTC. The 10th meeting (COP10) was originally due to take place in November 2023, and discussions were expected to focus in part on products other than cigarettes, such as e-cigarettes and heated tobacco products. Although they still form a small part of their business and profits, transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) repeatedly and loudly state that these products are key to their ‘transformation’ away from selling cigarettes (TobaccoTactics, 2022a). The executive—PMI’s senior vice-president of external affairs—said that he would travel to Panama ‘to publicly denounce the absurdity of being excluded’ (Marsh, 2023) from COP10. In fact, a key WHO FCTC provision, Article 5.3, requires Parties to do exactly that—to protect tobacco control policy from interference by the tobacco industry and others representing its interests. Given the widely recognized irreconcilable conflict between tobacco industry and public health interests, Parties are asked to actively work to prevent the industry from inserting itself in public health decision-making. In the end, COP10 was postponed to February 2024 and PMI watered down its stated goal—to ‘motivate governments to take action with appropriate regulations and provide responsible solutions to the market’ (Soy502, 2024 [authors’ translation]). Whatever the wording, it is clear that PMI perceives the WHO FCTC as a threat. It was also not the first time PMI had attempted to infiltrate COP. A 2017 Reuters investigation revealed that it had for many years ‘focused its vast global resources on bringing to heel the [WHO FCTC]’ (Kalra et al., 2017). The WHO FCTC gives its COP the power to take decisions to promote effective implementation in order to ‘reduce continually and substantially the prevalence of tobacco use’ (WHO, 2003). Therefore, it is a risk for a profit-led industry that benefits from the existence of the tobacco epidemic, particularly in the Global South, which includes key—in some cases growing—markets for cigarettes. The industry also seeks to expand the pool of new customers for its addictive products, whether or not they contain tobacco. Consequently, TTCs have a clear interest in interfering with, undermining or otherwise attempting to influence COP discussions. The Tobacco Control Research Group (TCRG) is an accredited observer to the COP and has monitored tobacco industry interference around COP. Key findings on COP10 were shared daily with the tobacco control community and published on TobaccoTactics—our knowledge exchange platform (TobaccoTactics, 2024a). At COP10, progress was achieved on most agenda items, including on environment, human rights, corporate liability, cross-border advertising and measures, which go beyond treaty obligations (WHO FCTC, 2024a). However, the tobacco control community lamented the deferral of a decision linked to Articles 9 and 10 to COP11 (GATC, 2024). These articles focus on regulating the content of tobacco products and tobacco product disclosures. As tobacco companies generally prefer not to be restricted in the pursuit of their goals or incur costs that might reduce their profits, this delay may prove beneficial to the industry. The decision-making process can be slowed down or obstructed, in some cases by delegations from countries that experience considerable industry interference. The Global Alliance for Tobacco Control (GATC, previously FCA) is an international coalition of civil society organizations campaigning for accelerated WHO FCTC implementation. Each day of COP, GATC gives out a ‘dirty ashtray’ award to one or more Parties for frustrating the decision-making process. At COP10, dirty ashtrays were awarded to the Philippines for ‘obstinate dispute and delay’; to Guyana for ‘grandstanding’ and wasting time; and to Guatemala for re-opening closed agenda items (GATC, 2024). In COP, non-parties can also take the floor during negotiations. At COP10, one non-party, the Dominican Republic, received a dirty ashtray ‘for misusing the Plenary session to promote the tobacco industry’ (GATC, 2024). In the latest Global Tobacco Industry Interference Index, a ranked assessment of how well governments protect public health policies from tobacco industry interference, the Dominican Republic came last out of the 90 countries (Assunta, 2023). Activities by ‘front groups’—organizations set up and funded by the tobacco industry—tend to intensify in the run-up to COP, with visitors to various websites encouraged to lobby their delegations. Some front groups were present in Panama, notably the International Tobacco Growers Association (ITGA) (TobaccoTactics, 2024b). Just before COP10, ITGA argued that excluding farmers’ associations from COP would be ‘a serious mistake’ as these were ‘the most strategic allies’ for governments in tobacco-growing countries (Aranda, 2024 [authors’ translation]). During COP10, ITGA met with the head of the Brazilian delegation, Brazil’s ambassador to Panama (Olá Jornal, 2024). Other groups are more active online. Well-worn industry arguments made frequent media appearances before COP, promoted by groups supported by industry money, or with unclear funding (TobaccoTactics, 2024c). For example, the World Vapers’ Alliance (WVA) was established in the run-up to COP9 by the US-based Consumer Choice Center, and both are funded by British American Tobacco (TobaccoTactics, 2024d). During COP, the WVA said that a plan to ‘prohibit [all nicotine products]’ would increase illicit trade (Katsiashvili, 2023). A representative of the Institute of Economic Affairs (a UK think tank with a history of collaboration with TTCs) called the WHO’s supposed stance on e-cigarettes ‘unscientific and fanatical’ (Blanchard, 2023). Knowledge-Action-Change (funded by the PMI-financed Foundation for a Smoke-Free World) said that COP lacked ‘public accountability and transparency’ (Global State of Tobacco Harm Reduction, 2023). Many of these arguments were echoed in media articles and tweets during COP. As with previous COPs, opaque organizations purporting to represent the interests of ‘consumers’ or ‘taxpayers’ have come to the fore. For example, in the run-up to COP10, a group called ‘WeVape’, linked to UK think tank, the Adam Smith Institute (which has accepted money from the tobacco industry), stated that e-cigarette users’ rights were ‘under attack’ (BackVaping, 2023). During COP10, the US-based Taxpayers Protection Alliance (TPA) ran a parallel ‘Good COP’ in Panama, promoting it as a ‘conference of the people’ (TobaccoTactics, 2024e). The event included speakers who criticized the COP, stating that it excluded consumers and lacked transparency—while ignoring the TPA’s lack of transparency regarding its own source(s) of funding. The ‘Good COP’ website stated that it was a ‘launch vehicle for a broader coalition of taxpayer, free market, and harm reduction organizations’, but membership remains unclear. The TPA’s list of ‘COP10 experts’ includes some individuals and companies funded or contracted by TTCs or involved in organizations linked to industry (TobaccoTactics, 2024e). ‘Good COP’ sessions were livestreamed on the TPA and ‘Regulator Watch’ YouTube channels, with commentary disseminated via local and international media platforms. Its points were echoed by other organizations, including the even less transparent ‘COPWATCH’ website ‘written and published by consumers of safer nicotine products’ (COPWATCH, 2021). Articles were published in FILTER, an outlet of the industry-funded Influence Foundation, which received funds from the TPA to attend ‘Good COP’ (TobaccoTactics, 2024f). Ultimately, the TPA welcomed the deferral of the decision on Articles 9 and 10 to COP11 (TPA, 2024). We draw three main lessons from our monitoring activities: First, Article 5.3 and relevant decisions (TobaccoTactics, 2022b) remain critically important for protecting public health. All Parties should require industry to be transparent about its spending and activities, and any attempts to lobby Party representatives, including diplomats, should be recorded—and countered. Parties also need to support civil society in monitoring and countering industry interference, providing necessary tools and protection. Second, it has become harder to identify organizations’ links with the tobacco industry. This fits with the wider trend of industry interference becoming increasingly covert (Hird et al., 2022), due in part to the success of the tobacco control movement. More sophisticated approaches are needed, including greater collaboration with investigative journalists and those working on other unhealthy commodity industries, for example investigating think tanks and consultancies that work across multiple industries. Finally, while industry-linked organizations use a range of platforms to create noise, these outsider strategies do not necessarily translate into impact. Some have applied for observer status to the WHO FCTC but have been denied access (WHO FCTC, 2024b), illustrating the effectiveness of Article 5.3. It is therefore vital that advocates and researchers are not distracted by the noise, but keep the focus firmly on the industry, its tactics and its ultimate goals. We thank Daniel Dorado and Jaime Arcila at Corporate Accountability and Louis Lawrence, Dr Sophie Braznell and Dr Duncan Thomas at TCRG who contributed to COP monitoring activities. This work, and the authors’ time, were funded by Bloomberg Philanthropies Stopping Tobacco Organizations and Products project funding (www.bloomberg.org). We have no conflict of interest to declare. Not applicable.