2025/01/12 by Joseph Millum · 1 voice · 3 citations
Biochemistry, Genetics and Molecular Biology · Medicine · #Argument (complex analysis) #Autonomy #BRCA gene mutations in cancer #Epistemology #Ethics and Legal Issues in Pediatric Healthcare #Law #Law and economics #Medicine #Philosophy #Political science #Prenatal Screening and Diagnostics #Selection (genetic algorithm) #Sociology
paper · pdf · doi:10.1111/japp.12790
published in Journal of Applied Philosophy 42(3), 871-886 (Wiley)
openalex publication_date 2025/01/12 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/05/21
ABSTRACT Liberals writing about the family frequently cite the child's ‘right to an open future’ in discussions of the ethics of parental decision‐making for young children. This purported right grounds certain claims on behalf of children in considerations related to their future autonomy. In this article, I argue that there is no compelling argument in favor of a distinctive ‘right to an open future’ construed as either a negative or a positive right. Insofar as claims made about the content of this purported right are justified, they can be grounded in the interests of the child or in other uncontroversial rights. Talk of a ‘right to an open future’ serves only to obscure the ethical considerations that actually matter and citing the right is not helpful in deciding what may or should be done. I illustrate this claim by reference to two examples of how the ‘right to an open future’ has been applied: one regarding genetic testing for adult‐onset disorders and one regarding selection for disabilities.