What makes us think? A three-stage dual-process model of analytic engagement

2015/06/16 by Gordon Pennycook, Jonathan A. Fugelsang, Derek J. Koehler · 1 voice · 4 citations
Decision Sciences · Neuroscience · Social Sciences · #Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics #Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies #Social and Intergroup Psychology

paper · doi:10.1016/j.cogpsych.2015.05.001

openalex publication_date 2015/06/16 · crossref created 2015/06/16 · crossref issued 2015/08/01 · crossref published 2015/08/01 · crossref published-print 2015/08/01 · crossref deposited 2023/08/11 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/31 · crossref indexed 2026/07/31

Citations

• Individual differences in rational thought.
• On the psychology of prediction.
• Self-Control
• A perspective on judgment and choice: Mapping bounded rationality.
• The case for motivated reasoning.
• Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate?

Cited by

• Advancing theorizing about fast-and-slow thinking
• Boosting debiasing: Impact of repeated training on reasoning
• Not all who ponder count costs: Arithmetic reflection predicts utilitarian tendencies, but logical reflection predicts both deontological and utilitarian tendencies
• Who benefits from debiasing?

Discussions

• #9 Pennycook, G., Fugelsang, J. A., & Koehler, D. J. (2015). What makes us think? A three-stage dual-process model of analytic engagement. Cognitive psychology, 80, 34–72. doi.org/10.1016/j.co... [bsky, 0 points, 1 comments]