2025/01/30 by Alexa Weiß, Matthias Forstmann · 1 voice
Social Sciences · #Corruption and Economic Development #Culture, Economy, and Development Studies #Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
paper · pdf · doi:10.1002/ejsp.3139
openalex publication_date 2025/01/30 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/06/25
ABSTRACT Corruption often involves collective actions rather than clandestine individual efforts. It is also socially facilitated via tacit complicity influenced by norms and beliefs. Five studies examine the delegation of decisions about corrupt behaviour as a social form of corruption and the role of attributing outcomes of delegated corrupt decisions to fate. In three correlational studies, belief in fate (i.e., perceiving events as ‘meant to be’ and predetermined) were positively associated with the delegation of decisions between non‐corrupt, ethical and corrupt, self‐serving behaviours to equally interested others in workplace scenarios. This effect was distinct from religious belief. In two experimental studies, participants attributed others’ corrupt decisions to fate more strongly when they served (vs. harmed) their self‐interest. Fate beliefs were positively associated with fate attributions. Collectively, these studies illuminate interindividual differences associated with delegating decisions and how beliefs may be strategically used to justify corrupt outcomes, emphasising the social aspects of corruption.