Religious Freedom, the Sex Discrimination Act, and Section 109: A Surrejoinder to Butler

2024/01/01 by Neil J Foster · 1 voice
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Social Sciences · #American Constitutional Law and Politics #Legal Systems and Judicial Processes #Legal and Constitutional Studies

paper · pdf · doi:10.55803/u458i

openalex publication_date 2024/01/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/07

Abstract

In a previous article, I argued that section 109 of the Australian Constitution would prohibit State laws imposing different and more demanding requirements on religious schools than requirements imposed by Federal laws. In a subsequent rejoinder, Nicholas Butler reached the opposite conclusion. In this surrejoinder, I return to a discussion of the High Court’s jurisprudence on section 109 and conclude that Butler’s critique is well-written but ultimately unconvincing.

Discussions

• In this surrejoinder, Neil Foster continues the debate on whether exemptions in state anti-discrimination laws impose different burdens on religious schools compared to the Cth Sex Discrimination Act, [bsky, 0 points, 0 comments]

Related

• Notes on Church–State Affairs
• Religious Exemptions in England
• Religion after the Royal Commission: Challenges to Religion–State Relations
• Maximising or Determining Rights? On Using (and Discarding) Statutory Exceptions
• ‘Leave it to the Women’ The Exclusion of Women from Anglican Church Government in Australia