2025/04/11 by Mateusz Kolaszyński, Dariusz Stolicki · 1 voice
Social Sciences · #Corruption and Economic Development
paper · doi:10.1080/08850607.2025.2479996
openalex publication_date 2025/04/11 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/19
Parliamentary intelligence oversight committees are one of the classic forms of intelligence oversight, yet they are frequently regarded as inadequate. Many reasons have been proposed, such as a claim that legislators neglect oversight because of lack of sustained electoral pressure, or that political alignment between the executive and the legislative majority dampens oversight zeal. We propose yet another hypothesis—one of regulatory capture. Oversight committee members, drawn into the secret world of intelligence and dealing regularly with its concerns, adopt the perspective of the entities they are supposed to oversee. In this article, only the legal status and membership of the committee are discussed. Through the analysis of membership, the aim is to test the asymmetry of interest hypothesis by establishing that, apart from members already connected with the industry (i.e., the intelligence services) committee membership does not meaningfully contribute to the members’ electoral and party-advancement prospects, and that the Sejm at large is not interested in strengthening the position of the committee because of the governing majorities’ persistent reluctance to strengthen oversight mechanisms.