2021/12/01 by Víctor M. Verdejo, Xavier de Donato‐Rodríguez, Xavier de Donato Rodríguez
Arts and Humanities · Neuroscience · Psychology · #Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics #Free Will and Agency #Philosophy and Theoretical Science
paper · pdf · doi:10.1111/theo.12364
crossref issued 2021/12/01 · crossref published 2021/12/01 · crossref published-print 2021/12/01 · openalex publication_date 2021/12/01 · crossref published-online 2021/12/03 · crossref created 2021/12/03 · crossref deposited 2023/08/25 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · crossref indexed 2026/07/31 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/31
Abstract In this paper, we bring into focus the level of thought or content in the elucidation of disagreement. We set out the view that disagreement at this level involves a specific form of noncotenability, namely, noncotenability as captured by sense or intension as opposed to reference. We present the challenge that nourishes the alternative referential view and suggest, through examples, that (i) only intensional disagreement is apt to adequately accommodate basic rationality constraints on disagreement, and (ii) it can meet the aforementioned challenge insofar as we discriminate between noncotenability affecting one's concepts, intensionally conceived, and noncotenability affecting merely one's particular understanding of those concepts. We conclude that intensional disagreement is our best choice for an account of disagreement at the level of thought.