Condorcet Social Choice Functions

1977/11/01 by Peter C. Fishburn · 17 citations
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · #Game Theory and Voting Systems

paper · doi:10.1137/0133030

crossref issued 1977/11/01 · crossref published 1977/11/01 · crossref published-print 1977/11/01 · openalex publication_date 1977/11/01 · crossref created 2005/02/23 · crossref deposited 2017/01/29 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · crossref indexed 2026/08/03 · openalex updated_date 2026/08/03

Abstract

A Condorcet social choice function elects the candidate that beats every other candidate under simple majority when such a candidate exists. Various extensions of Condorcet’s simple majority principle that deal with situations that have no simple majority winner have been proposed.Nine Condorcet social choice functions are analyzed and compared on the basis of how well they satisfy a number of conditions for social choice functions. The conditions include several generalizations of Condorcet’s Principle. Remarks on the relative merits of the nine basic functions are included.

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