Hybrid choice systems in small-n elections with sophisticated electorates

2025/07/01 by Iain McLean · 1 voice
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Social Sciences · Computer Science · #Game Theory and Voting Systems #Electoral Systems and Political Participation #Internet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting

paper · pdf · doi:10.1007/s11127-025-01308-y

openalex publication_date 2025/07/01 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/31

Abstract

Abstract Faced with the classic paradoxes of voting, system designers have sometimes offered hybrid systems. The paper reviews Condorcet–Borda hybrids proposed by Daunou, Dodgson, Nanson, and Kemeny; and Borda-Balinski hybrids in use in at least one scientific academy. The justification of the hybrids is practical rather than theoretical, as they cannot escape the known features of their parent systems. In particular, as Condorcet showed in 1788, all Borda systems violate independence of irrelevant alternatives (in some formulation).

Citations

• On the Rationale of Group Decision-making
• The Bargaining Problem
• Manipulation of Nanson's and Baldwin's Rules
• Exact Analysis of Dodgson Elections: Lewis Carroll's 1876 Voting System is Complete for Parallel Access to NP

Discussions

• Hybrid choice systems in small-n elections with sophisticated electorates doi.org/10.1007/s111... Paper in Public Choice by @nuffieldcollege.bsky.social Senior Research Fellow @iainsmcl.bsky.social [bsky, 0 points, 0 comments]