2013/07/08 by Daniela Campello · 1 citation
Economics, Econometrics and Finance · Social Sciences · #Global Financial Crisis and Policies #International Development and Aid #Fiscal Policies and Political Economy
paper · doi:10.1177/0010414013488539
openalex publication_date 2013/07/08 · openalex created_date 2025/10/10 · openalex updated_date 2026/05/21
The persistence of policy switches—whereby presidents renege on campaign promises shortly after winning elections—30 years after Latin America’s redemocratization defies established notions of democratic representation, and poses a puzzle to analysts and voters alike. In this article, I advance current explanations for switches, by arguing they can only be understood in the context of currency booms and crises, typical of Latin American economies after their reintegration into world finance in the 1970s. To test my propositions empirically, I examine elections held in the region between 1978 and 2006 and find evidence consistent with the claim that switches are more likely to occur in periods of dollar scarcity, when the need to attract financial capital to the economy pushes leftist presidents into adopting policies opposed to the programs they announced during campaign.