2018/06/01 by Marcus Mietzner · 2 citations
Social Sciences · #Asian Studies and History #Indonesian Election Politics and Participation #Islamic Studies and Radicalism
paper · doi:10.5509/2018912261
crossref issued 2018/06/01 · crossref published 2018/06/01 · crossref published-online 2018/06/01 · crossref published-print 2018/06/01 · openalex publication_date 2018/06/01 · crossref created 2018/06/12 · openalex created_date 2018/06/21 · crossref deposited 2026/06/16 · crossref indexed 2026/07/28 · openalex updated_date 2026/07/28
The global rise of populist campaigns against democratic governments has revived the long-standing scholarly debate on how democracies can best defend themselves against anti-democratic challenges. While some view an aggressive militant democracy approach as the most effective option, others propose accommodation of populist actors and voters. Others again suggest a merging of the two paradigms. This article analyzes how the government of Indonesian President Jokowi has responded to the unprecedented Islamist-populist mobilization in the capital Jakarta in late 2016. Unsystematically mixing elements of all available options, Jokowi’s administration pursued a criminalization strategy against populists that violated established legal norms, and launched vaguely targeted but patronage-oriented accommodation policies. As a result, the government’s attempt to protect the democratic status quo from populist attacks turned into a threat to democracy itself. Indonesian democracy, I argue, is now in a slow but perceptible process of deconsolidation.